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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 22, 1988, the Attorneys General of eight states
filed antitrust actions in state and federal courts' alleging that
major insurance and reinsurance companies colluded to boycott
specific types of insurance coverage2 in violation of section 1 of
the Sherman Act.3 The suits suggest that this collusion was
responsible for the unprecedented increase in premiums and
concomitant erosion of coverage that has come to be known as
"the insurance crisis."' 4 The lawsuits have provoked fierce deni-
als by insurance industry participants, including assertions that
the suits, which came in an election year, were politically moti-
vated.' The litigation is certain to involve some of the country's
highest-paid law firms in a protracted struggle that, by all esti-
mates, will cost many millions of dollars.6
The allegations of collusion, however, are directly at odds
with one prominent explanation of the insurance crisis. In a
recent article, Professor George Priest specifically rejects the
view that "the insurance crisis has been caused by explicit price-
fixing by commercial casualty insurers."'7 Instead, he offers an
1. Alabama, California, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California. In addition, Texas filed a related complaint in a Texas state court. New York
Attorney General's Office, Fact Sheet on the Multi-State Prosecution ofAntitrust Violations
in the Insurance Industry, March 22, 1988, at 1 (unpublished manuscript on fie with
authors) [hereinafter Fact Sheet]. In June, 10 more states-Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut,
Maryland, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Washington-filed
"largely identical" actions in the same court. Shalowitz & Bradford, Antitrust Litigation
Mounts: 10 New States Sue Insurers, Bus. INS., June 20, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
2. Fact Sheet, supra note 1, at 1.
3. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
4. See, eg., Sorry, Your Policy is Canceled, TIME, Mar. 24, 1986, at 18; Brody, When
Products Turn Into Liabilities, FORTUNE, Mar. 3, 1986, at 20.
5. "Several observers said there was a definite political motivation behind the suits,
noting that some of the attorneys general are seeking office this year." Greenwald,
Lawsuits Rock Industry, Bus. INS., Mar. 28, 1988, at 37, col. 1; see also An Outrageous
Waste, Bus. INs., Apr. 4, 1988, at 8, col. 2 ("Perhaps the suits are merely designed as a
publicity stunt for politically ambitious attorneys general.").
6. Shalowitz, Industry's Defense to Be Costly, Bus. INS., Apr. 11, 1988, at 47.
7. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521,
1527 (1987) (citations omitted). Interviewed after the filing, Professor Priest commented:
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alternative theory that explains the breakdown in insurance mar-
kets by the judicial expansion of liability that caused markets for
certain types of insurance coverage to unravel.
The insurance industry's first public response might be
interpreted as a demurrer-even taken as true, the allegations do
not describe illegal behavior. 9 Important facts in the case have
not yet emerged or are in dispute. Nevertheless, we seek to eval-
uate the credibility of various explanations of the defendants'
behavior before society devotes the immense resources necessary
to litigate an antitrust suit of this proportion. Using the lens of
economic theory, we examine whether the states' case is plausi-
ble taking the facts set forth in the complaints as true. This
Article will therefore analyze, under a demurrer standard,
whether a coherent economic theory underlies the plaintiffs'
Sherman Act claims.
In the first section, we set out the alleged facts and describe
the states' theory of the case. The second section not only criti-
cizes the economic plausibility of the collusive explanation, but
also finds Priest's competitive explanation to be at odds with the
alleged facts. The final section argues that an exclusionary
explanation may provide the best factual fit, although discovery
is warranted.
II. THE STATES' THEORY OF THE CASE
A. Eliminating Types of Insurance Coverage
The Attorneys General allege that four of the country's
largest insurance companies 1 --together with major domestic
and international reinsurers1 and the industry's trade organiza-
"If this case were to go to the Supreme Court, it would probably dismiss it. The Supreme
Court has been hostile to such wide-reaching investigations of industries without a clear
understanding of the issues involved." Greenwald, supra note 5, at 37, col. 1.
8. Priest, supra note 7, at 1534-35. An alternative noncollusive theory suggests that
the dramatic increase in premiums was caused by escalating predictions of future legal
liability. Epstein, Shooting the Insurance Messenger, Chicago Tribune, May 30, 1986, § 1,
at 25, col. 1.
9. An Outrageous Waste, supra note 5.
10. These companies were Hartford, Allstate, CIGNA, and Aetna.
11. Reinsurance companies offer insurance for the insurance companies who are the
issuers of primary insurance policies. Domestic reinsurers included, among others, General
Reinsurance Corporation and North American Reinsurance Corporation; foreign
reinsurers included a number of Lloyd's of London syndicates. Complaint, New York v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 88 Civ. 0983WWS (N.D. Cal. filed March 22, 1988) [hereinafter
Complaint]. The seven state suits filed in the Northern District of California have been
1989]
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tion' 2-conspired to eliminate three types of insurance coverage
from commercial general liability (CGL) policies. 13 As
described below, CGL policies are written under an industry-
wide standard form promulgated by the Insurance Services
Office (ISO). The standard form explains the terms and condi-
tions under which insurance is offered.
According to the complaints, the conspirators sought to
exclude coverage for pollution damages and certain lawyers' fees
from CGL policies, and to reduce the time period covered by the
ISO CGL forms. Specifically:
(1) The traditional CGL coverage for sudden or accidental
pollution was eliminated under the revised 1986 ISO CGL
forms; 14
(2) Revised CGL forms end the historical obligation of the
insurer to pay the full legal costs of defending a claim and sub-
stitute a defense cost cap, under which the insured's legal
defense costs are counted as part of the stated policy limits;15
(3) New CGL forms are written on a claims-made rather
than an occurrence basis. Under a claims-made policy, policy-
holders are covered for all claims made while the policy is in
effect. By contrast, an occurrence policy provides coverage for
claims whenever they are made, as long as they are based on
incidents that occurred while the policy was in effect. (See Fig-
ure at Appendix). For example, under an old occurrence pol-
icy covering the year 1956, insureds were protected against
claims made by workers who were exposed to asbestos during
that year, even if the claims were not filed until 1986. The
move to a claims-made form therefore eliminated the insured's
coverage for prospective claims made after the expiration of a
current policy, the so-called long tail risk.16
consolidated before Judge William W. Schwarzer under docket number 88 Civ. 1688WWS.
The complaints are virtually identical.
12. The Insurance Services Office, Inc. is a nonprofit trade organization for
approximately 1,400 primary property/casualty insurance companies operating in the
United States.
13. Complaint, supra note 11, at 4-5. Most businesses, municipalities, and nonprofit
organizations have traditionally purchased CGL insurance to cover third-party casualty
damage claims. CGL insurance does not include coverage for damage to the property of an
insured. Id at 5.
14. Id. at 6.
15. Id. In other words, lawyers' fees were deducted from total coverage under the
new CGL forms. Under the old forms, a $2 million policy would pay for $2 million in
damage awards as well as any legal fees incurred in defending against a claim.
16. The tail refers to the length of time during which claims may be made after a
given injury. Id Priest notes that tails of varying lengths-ranging from five years to sixty
days-are now being offered. Priest, supra note 7, at 1575-76. Long tail risks are
974 [Vol. 63
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(4) The movement to the claims-made form by itself would
not have eliminated insurers' liability for past injuries if the
claims for these injuries were made while a current policy was
in effect. That is, a claims-made policy for 1986 would still
cover claims arising out of an injury that occurred in 1956, as
long as the claims were filed during 1986. (See Figure at
Appendix). To eliminate their responsibility for these past
risks, however, insurance companies changed the CGL forms
to include a retroactive provision. This provision ended insur-
ance companies' liability for injuries that occurred before a cer-
tain date, typically the start of the policy term.17
The various modifications of the CGL forms can be viewed
as manifestations of a single phenomenon. The old CGL forms
offered the insureds coverage for a bundle of risks. The new
forms unbundled three different types of insurance while simul-
taneously eliminating all coverage for certain risks. The new
CGL forms left each of these risks-pollution coverage, cover-
age for high legal fees, and long tail claims-completely
uncovered.
B. Mechanisms Used to Change the CGL Forms
Insurance industry supporters admit that the companies
met,... talked, and.., agreed that they wanted to write com-
mercial general liability insurance on a claims-made form and
that coverage for pollution damage should not be written as
part and parcel of the CGL form. They decided these changes
were necessary for ... them.., to conduct business on sound
financial footing.18
But the Attorneys General argue that the major insurers
and reinsurers went further, using "boycotts, threats, intimida-
tion and other coercive conduct"1 9 in their efforts to get the
changes in coverage adopted. According to the Attorneys Gen-
eral,20 the boycott and other coercive conduct constitute per se
particularly important in the case of latent injuries such as exposure to asbestos, when the
lag between initial exposure and onset of symptoms (and hence, of claims) is measured in
decades. Felstiner & Siegelman, Neoclassical Difficulties: Tort Deterrence for Latent
Injuries (forthcoming in LAW & POLICY (1989)). The claims-made form gives insurers the
option to limit their liability for future claims by refusing to renew the policies of insureds
who exhibit an unexpected increase in claims.
17. Fact Sheet, supra note 1, at 3.
18. An Outrageous Waste, supra note 5, at 8.
19. Complaint, supra note 11, at 3.
20. Fact Sheet, supra note 1, at 10.
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violations of the Sherman Act2 and related state antitrust laws.
Specifically, the' complaints allege that the reinsurers, in conspir-
acy with the large insurance companies, threatened to stop
underwriting CGL insurance unless the new forms were
adopted. The alleged boycott centered on the control of two
inputs essential to the provision of CGL insurance-pooled
information (statistical support) and access to reinsurance mar-
kets. The complaints allege that the conspirators threatened to
withhold supply of one essential input-reinsurance--in an
attempt to control the provision of the other essential input-
ISO forms supported by pooled information.22
1. Statistical Support
Insurance policies require statistical support-actuarial
data-on the claims record for a given type of policy. In order
to know the appropriate premium to charge on a particular type
of policy, the issuing firm must have a good estimate of the
probability that insureds will make claims for damages against
that policy and of the likely amount of such claims. The ISO
promulgates standard form policies so that the claims informa-
tion of its more than 1,400 members will be comparable, and
thus can meaningfully be pooled. The law of large numbers23
implies that the estimates derived from the pooled claims of all
insurance companies will give a more accurate picture of the
expected value of claims under a policy than will the experience
of any company taken by itself.2 4
21. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). The McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015
(1982 & Supp. 1985), grants a limited exemption to the insurance industry from antitrust
laws:
Congress provided in § 2(b) [of the Act] that the antitrust laws "shall be
applicable" unless the activities of insurance companies are the business of
insurance and regulated by state law. Moreover, under § 3(b) the Sherman Act
was made applicable in any event to acts of boycott, coercion, or intimidation.
Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 221 (1979). Because it is
unclear what degree of state regulation is necessary to trigger the Act, companies in states
that have deregulated insurance premiums might not be exempt from the Act. But see
Ohio AFL-CIO v. Insurance Rating Bd., 451 F.2d 1178, 1184 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 917 (1972) (a potential for state supervision is sufficient to establish the
exemption).
22. Complaint, supra note 11, at 3.
23. The law of large numbers dictates that as the sample size becomes large, a sample
mean will tend to converge to the actual mean of the population from which the sample is
drawn. R. HOGG & E. TANIS, PROBABILITY AND STATISTICAL INFERENCE 153-54 (1977).
24. Complaint, supra note 11, at 23, argues that for all but the largest insurers, it is
impossible to operate profitably without using the ISO database; according to the
976 [Vol. 63
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A further cost savings from the use of ISO forms arises
from the regulatory context. In most states, regulatory authori-
ties must approve insurance forms: companies wishing to use
nonstandard forms must secure regulatory approval from multi-
ple jurisdictions rather than relying on the ISO to do so for
them. This extra effort makes it considerably more expensive for
any single company to use non-ISO forms.25
The complaint alleges that two of the defendant compa-
nies-Hartford and Aetna-pressured the ISO to end its statisti-
cal support for the occurrence form and to endorse only the
claims-made form, which the ISO had been considering in 1984.
The plaintiffs contend that the defendants objected not only to
the ISO's proposal to continue supporting the old occurrence
form, but also to certain provisions of the claims-made form
(specifically, the inclusion of pollution coverage, absence of
defense cost cap, and lack of retroactive provision).26 The
attempt to force the ISO to adopt only a claims-made form was a
failure. On December 15, 1983, the ISO Board of Directors
decided to support both the old occurrence form and a claims-
made form that did not contain the retroactive date, defense cost
cap, or pollution exclusion provisions.
After the defendants failed to achieve their aims through
the ISO, they allegedly sought to use control of the second major
essential input to force the abandonment of the old form and its
replacement by the form they favored.
2. Access to Reinsurance Markets
The second crucial input in the provision of an insurance
policy is reinsurance. Even with standardized policy forms and
industry-wide actuarial information, insurance companies need
to maintain a portfolio of diversified risks.27 Thus, if a firm
writes a ten million dollar CGL policy but already has a large
complaint, two large CGL insurers attempted to develop and support their own forms in
1984 but found it unprofitable to do so. See also R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK,
ANTrrRusT 1045 (1981) ("The casualty and life insurance business can operate efficiently
only if each firm has substantial information about the likelihood of injury, death, and so
on in specific classes of cases. The data are most useful if aggregated across the experience
of many insurors.").
25. Telephone conversation with New York Assistant Attorney General George
Sampson (April 27, 1988).
26. Complaint, supra note 11, at 27.
27. See R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 24, at 1045 ("[S]ome policies call
for large payments, so large that it is prudent for a firm to 'reinsure' them.").
1989]
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volume of other CGL policies outstanding, then it may choose to
sell off some of the ten million dollar risk by purchasing insur-
ance from a reinsurer against claims made on the policy.
The Attorneys General allege that the defendant insurance
companies organized a boycott by major domestic and interna-
tional reinsurers of the 1984 ISO claims-made form.28 Believing
that they would not be able to reinsure policies written under the
1984 form, other insurance companies agreed to modify the
form along the lines favored by the defendant companies.29 In
September 1984, the ISO's Executive Committee voted to accept
many of the defendants' proposed modifications. 30 The ISO did
not agree to eliminate the old occurrence form, however, and the
Attorneys General allege that the defendants then tried to
organize a boycott by reinsurers of the old occurrence form.31
Whether this attempt was successful is a matter of some
dispute. The ISO did withdraw its support for the old occur-
rence form on July 1, 1987.32 The Attorneys General claim that
"[w]ithout such support, ISO members could not continue to use
the 1973' occurrence form .... Although many insurance con-
sumers preferred the 1973 [occurrence] forms, the availability of
this type of coverage has been severely restricted. ' 33 However,
Business Insurance, a trade publication, claims in a lead editorial
and in several articles that the 1973 occurrence form has contin-
ued to be "the most widely used CGL form,"' 34 and that "most
CGL risks are still written on occurrence forms. '35
In sum, the complaints maintain that the defendants repeat-
edly attempted to boycott the old occurrence forms and with-
hold reinsurance of policies using these forms. Richard Posner
has advocated, however, that boycotts "are properly attacked
under the antitrust laws when, and only when, they are
employed to enforce a practice that is objectionable on the basis
of substantive antitrust policy."' 36 For Posner, boycotts can be
28. Complaint, supra note 11, at 27-31.
29. Id. at 34. The new forms excluded pollution coverage and contained a retroactive
date provision. The defense-within-limits provision was not part of the new form, although
the ISO Executive Committee allegedly agreed to consider inclusion of such a provision at
a later date. Id
30. Id.
31. Id. at 34-39.
32. Id. at 38.
33. Id. at 39.
34. An Outrageous Waste, supra note 5, at 8.
35. Greenwald, supra note 5, at 37.
36. R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPEcTIVE 210 (1976).
[Vol. 63
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used to further both pro-competitive and anti-competitive ends,
so that economically rational antitrust analysis should proscribe
only boycotts that seek to restrain trade.37 This Article will now
examine competing explanations for the defendants' alleged
actions in an attempt to determine their economic motivations.
Our goal is to determine, taking the plaintiffs' allegations as true,
whether the boycott was designed to restrain trade.
III. Do THE ALLEGATIONS STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION?
A. The States' Theory of Collusion
The complaints are unusual documents in two respects.
First, they allege underlying facts with great specificity. Instead
of generally asserting that defendants entered into a conspiracy
"on or about a certain date," the complaints detail specific meet-
ings and events.38 But combined with this wealth of factual
detail is an analytic poverty of motive or purpose. Complaints
often include only general allegations of motive. However, these
complaints are unusual because the plaintiffs' theory of the case
completely fails to elaborate why the defendants undertook the
alleged conspiracy. In short, the plaintiffs fail to explain how the
conspiracy could have increased the conspirators' profits.
While profitability has not been an element of Sherman Act
cases, courts, especially since Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.
37. Posner elaborates:
A boycott is simply a method of self-help enforcement. It can be used by firms to
enforce a cartel, in which event it is bad because cartels are bad; but it can equally
well be used, and often is, by firms or individuals to enforce a code of truthful
advertising, to minimize credit risk, or to express opposition to communism, or
racial discrimination, or the use of nonunion labor.
Id. at 207. Under this theory, the McCarran-Ferguson Act's exemption for all acts except
"boycott, coercion or intimidation" is especially misguided. See R. POSNER & F. EASTER-
BROOK, supra note 24, at 1044 ("If price fixing is lawful under the McCarran-Ferguson Act
when done explicitly, why not allow it when achieved by a boycott?").
The Act may, however, be a rational way of fostering information pooling while dis-
couraging welfare-reducing collusion. Because the ability to punish breaches of collusive
agreements is a prerequisite to successful collusion, see Ayres, How Cartels Punish: A
Structural Theory of Self-Enforcing Collusion, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 295 (1987), prohibiting
boycott as a method of punishment may undercut the insurance industry's ability to pun-
ish. If the incentives to deviate from pro-competitive information pooling are smaller than
the incentives to deviate from anti-competitive price collusion, then the Act may instru-
mentally further Posner's goal of disaggregating efficient and inefficient behavior.
38. For example, the complaint alleges that the defendants conspired at "a dinner at
the Garrick Club, a private men's club [in London] ... on July 4, 1984," Complaint, supra
note 11, at 30, and another dinner on "the evening of September 19, 1984... at The Board
Room Club, a private club in New York City." Id at 33.
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v. Zenith Radio Corp. ,a have been extremely skeptical of alleged
conspiracies that are found to be irrational-that is, unprofita-
ble. In Matsushita, the Supreme Court reversed a denial of sum-
mary judgment against plaintiffs who had alleged that Japanese
electronics manufacturers conspired to sell television compo-
nents below cost. Although there was evidence indicating that
the firms engaged in predatory pricing, the Court stressed eco-
nomic theory, suggesting that such pricing is rarely profitable. 40
Therefore, the decision signalled that summary judgment would
be appropriate when plaintiffs lacked an economically coherent
motive to conspire:
[T]he absence of any plausible motive to engage in the conduct
charged is highly relevant to whether [summary judgment
should be granted]. Lack of motive bears on the range of per-
missible conclusions that might be drawn from ambiguous evi-
dence: if petitioners had no rational economic motive to
conspire, and if their conduct is consistent with other, equally
plausible explanations, the conduct does not give rise to an
inference of conspiracy.4"
An unfriendly reading of the case might suggest that absence of
motive can even trump direct evidence of predation.42 Accord-
ingly, post-Matsushita antitrust plaintiffs are well-advised to link
allegations of conspiracy to a profitable motive.
On its face, the Attorneys General's theory lacks a plausible
explanation for why the defendants would have entered into the
cartel. As described above, the attempted changes in the ISO
forms may represent an effort to unbundle and eliminate com-
pletely the sale of three distinct types of insurance coverage.
Although cartels will generally try to restrict output,4 3 reducing
output to zero would only succeed in eliminating all cartel prof-
its for those types of coverage. 44 Under standard cartel theory,
colluding firms want to reduce, but not eliminate, output, so that
39. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
40. Id at 589 ("[T]here is a consensus among commentators that predatory pricing
schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful.").
41. Id. at 596-97.
42. See id. at 594 n.19 ("expert opinion evidence of below-cost pricing has little
probative value in comparison with the economic factors.., that suggest that such conduct
is irrational"); see also id. at 606 (White, J., dissenting).
43. See, e.g., Ibrahim, Oil Prices Stabilize on Hopes for a Production Agreement, N.Y.
Times, May 4, 1988, at D2, col. 1 (OPEC continues to attempt to curtail oil production).
44. Formally, cartels will never want to reduce output beyond the point at which
marginal revenue exceeds marginal cost. R. POSNER, supra note 36, at 243.
980 [Vol. 63
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they can sell the remaining goods at a higher price.45 The
alleged conduct seems to be an irrational way to organize a
cartel.
In addition, eliminating long tail, pollution, and legal fees
coverage should not have increased the profitability of or the
demand for the remaining types of CGL coverage because the
components of the standard CGL bundle do not seem to be
demand substitutes for each other.46 Cartels have incentives to
fulfill consumers' desires efficiently, but to do so at an inflated
price.47 Making the "stripped down" CGL coverage less desira-
ble should therefore reduce the potential profits from collusion.
To tell a persuasive collusionary story, the Attorneys Gen-
eral must explain how a change to the new CGL forms would
have increased the defendants' ability to collude. But neither the
complaints nor the accompanying fact sheet4 8 provides such an
explanation. The plaintiffs have vaguely alleged that the defend-
ants sought to "sell the stripped down [CGL forms] at a deluxe
price,"'49 but they did not indicate why the defendants could not
have more profitably sold the CGL policy at a super-deluxe
pricer ° or alternatively, why competition would not reduce the
stripped down CGL price to the competitive level.5' In either
case, plaintiffs need to explain how the conspiracy would
increase the defendants' ability to collude over price. If they
could collude after the forms were changed, why could they not
collude beforehand? If they could not collude on the old forms,
45. See Priest, supra note 7, at 1528.
46. For example, it is difficult to see how pollution insurance can substitute for other
types of CGL insurance. By definition, two goods are complements if an increase in the
price of one leads to a decrease in the quantity demanded of the other. Note that even if the
components of the CGL coverage were substitutes, eliminating some of them would not
necessarily increase the overall profit compared with what would have been earned when
all components were sold simultaneously.
47. For example, it would be hard to see how agreeing to sell cars without radios
could increase the profitability of an automobile cartel. See Steiner, Program Patterns and
Preferences, and the Workability of Competition in Radio Broadcasting, 66 Q.J. ECON. 194
(1952) (monopolists provide more diverse programming than competitors clustering
around the median taste).
48. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
49. Fact Sheet, supra note I, at 4.
50. As indicated above, colluding over a desirable product should be more profitable
than colluding over an inferior quality product.
51. Plaintiffs might argue that although defendants could not induce state insurance
commissions to raise the price of the old policies above competitive levels, they could keep
the state commissions from lowering the current premiums when the new, lower-quality
coverage was introduced. The magnitude of this regulatory effect is questionable, however,
as many states no longer set CGL premium rates.
1989] 981
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why would changing the forms increase their ability to do so
nOW?
5 2
B. Priest's Theory of Competitive Unraveling
Not only does the alleged behavior appear inconsistent with
traditional cartel behavior, but it also seems equally inconsistent
with traditional notions of competitive behavior: competition
would not lead to concerted efforts to eliminate the supply of
products at any price. Indeed, this unwillingness to provide cer-
tain types of insurance at any price was central to the insurance
crisis.
Professor George Priest has provided an important
response to this criticism.53 His theory explains the elimination
of certain types of insurance without recourse to concerted
anticompetitive behavior by insurance companies. Priest ties his
theory not to the regulated structure of the industry, but to the
informational aspects of risk pooling that are uniquely central to
the provision of insurance.5 4
In a competitive insurance market, premiums will be tied to
the average expected liability of the insureds. To the extent that
insurers are not able to differentiate among people with high-
and low-liability risks, the premium charged will be too high for
low-risk insureds and too low for high-risk insureds, so that the
low-risk insureds will effectively cross-subsidize the high-risk
52. See infra notes 66-96 and accompanying text for our suggestions of two possible
mechanisms by which the changes in forms might have facilitated collusion.
53. See generally Priest, supra note 7.
54. Priest's article is the first to analyze comprehensively the relationship between the
judicial expansion of tort liability and the insurance crisis. It suggests that the expansion of
tort liability has amounted to mandated provision of third-party insurance by sellers of
products and services. In many cases, Priest argues, the judicial tying of the sale of
insurance to the sale of the underlying product or service has resulted in unwanted
insurance by inefficient providers. (For example, Priest notes that tort law increasingly
provides insurance coverage for nonpecuniary losses, even though "no first-party insurance
market provides [such] coverage." Id. at 1553.) Although the analysis that follows takes
issue with Priest's unqualified rejection of anticompetitive theories of the crisis, we do not
question these important insights of his work.
Other analyses of the tort crisis have also been forthcoming. See, e.g., Symposium, 48
OHIO ST. L.J. 317 (1987), especially Abraham, Making Sense of the Liability Insurance
Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 399 (1987); Tort Reform Symposium, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 795
(1987), especially Trebilcock, The Social Insurance-Deterrence Dilemma of Modern North
American Tort Law: A Canadian Perspective on the Liability Insurance Crisis, 24 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 929 (1987); Perspective on the Insurance Crisis: Symposium, 5 YALE J. ON
REG. 367 (1988), especially Winter, The Liability Crisis and the Dynamics of Competitive
Insurance Markets, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 455 (1988); see also P. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE
LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988).
982 [Vol. 63
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consumers. If the risk pool becomes too diverse, low-risk con-
sumers may drop out of the pool, choosing instead to self-insure
rather than pay the cross-subsidy.
Priest suggests that changes in the liability system increased
the heterogeneity of consumer risks, to the point that insurance
for these types of risk began to unravel:
The unraveling process would consist of the lowest-risk mem-
bers of the pool dropping out, which, in turn, would necessitate
premium increases. The premium increases would be followed
by a new set of lowest-risk members dropping out; then, further
increases in premiums; and so on, in successive episodes of
withdrawals and premium rises.55
For Priest, the insurance crisis originated in changes in the legal
system that caused insurance markets to unravel; and the
attempts of the insurance companies to change the forms were
attempts to stop or mitigate this unraveling.
Priest argues that the insurers moved to exclude the three
types of coverage as "a method to narrow insurance risk pools in
the face of the increasing legal risk generated by modem tort
law:' '56
55. Priest, supra note 7, at 1576. Priest does not fully explain why this unraveling
should be complete. When low-risk insureds drop out of the pool, the variance of the
remaining risk pool is reduced (albeit with a higher mean risk). At some point, after
successive waves of low-risk insureds have exited the pool, the remaining risk pool should
be homogeneous enough to support a stable (higher) premium.
At various points in the article, Priest begins to offer explanations for why the
unraveling may be complete. For example, complete unraveling should occur if there is
significant moral hazard accompanying the adverse selection of Priest's theory, whereby
the high risk insureds would take actions to become even riskier as the unraveling
proceeded. Id. at 1583 n.244. Alternatively, if the high-risk insureds left in the pool after
the adverse selection are too small a group for the law of large numbers significantly to
diversify risk, then unraveling might be complete.
Priest analogously argues that changes in the liability system that decrease
independence of risk can undermine the diversification benefits of the large numbers. Id. at
1563. As risks become more interdependent, insurers are effectively insuring just one big
risk.
Finally, Priest suggests that for events that are virtually certain, the comparative
advantage of insurance companies over self-insurance falls. Id. at 1582-83. At the extreme,
purchasing insurance against an event that will occur with probability 1.0 requires a
premium equal to the expected value of the loss. Rather than purchasing such a policy, an
insured could simply set aside the amount of the loss in a savings account. Thus, Priest
argues that the contraction of risk pools leaves only insureds with high probabilities of loss
in the market. However, it is precisely such insureds who can self-insure relatively cheaply
compared to the costs of purchasing insurance. When these insureds choose to cover
themselves by setting aside their own reserves against losses, market deterioration might be
complete.
56. Id. at 1576.
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Each of these coverage exclusions represents an effort to nar-
row risk pools and make them attractive to low-risk mem-
bers.... The exclusion from municipality policies of claims
relating to pollution narrows the risk pool to those cities whose
managers have never authorized, regulated, or otherwise moni-
tored hazardous waste sites or waste disposal.... Similarly,
the adoption of a claims-made policy narrows the risk pool by
excluding coverage of the long tails of liability exposure that
are increasingly common in chemical, pharmaceutical, and
hazardous waste industries.57
The potential power of Priest's theory is that it provides a com-
petitive explanation for two crucial aspects of the insurance
crisis:
(1) insurance premiums have increased more rapidly than
damage awards; and
(2) there has been a dramatic move toward self-insurance.
If true, Priest's competitive unraveling theory provides a truly
benign-indeed benevolent-motive for the insurers' actions: by
choosing new forms that reduced the variance of the risk pool,
the insurers could have protected all insureds from unraveling
insurance markets and prevented grossly inequitable cross-
subsidization.
Moreover, Priest's theory suggests that the insurance com-
panies' actions were not concerted. Such a suggestion is espe-
cially important after Matsushita because "[t]o survive a motion
for summary judgment or for a directed verdict, a plaintiff seek-
ing damages for a violation of § 1 [of the Sherman Act] must
present evidence 'that tends to exclude the possibility' that the
alleged conspirators acted independently." 8 Priest's theory pro-
vides the possibility of independent action. Given that CGL
insurance needed to be written on standard forms for actuarial
reasons, each insurance company had an independent reason to
lobby for a change to more efficient forms. Simply because the
actions were parallel does not mean they were necessarily
concerted. 9
Priest's scenario of competitive unraveling, however, rests
57. Id at 1574-75.
58. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986)
(quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984)).
59. Central to the concept of concerted action is the element of consideration---"I
will reduce output, if you agree to as well." Competitive markets, alternatively, are awash
with parallel, independent acts-witnessed, inter alia, by competitors' choice of an identical
(competitive) price. See VI P. AREEDA, ANTrrRusT LAW (1986).
984 [Vol. 63
INSURANCE ANTITRUST SUITS
crucially on the dual assumptions that insurance companies can-
not differentiate between low- and high-risk insureds, but that
the insureds themselves can. If either assumption fails, the
unraveling would not take place. If insurers could differentiate
between high- and low-risk insureds, they could eliminate the
cross-subsidization by charging different premiums to consum-
ers with different risks.60 If the insureds themselves could not
differentiate their risks under a new legal rule, they would be in
no better position than the insurance companies to assess
whether they are subsidizing others in the risk pool or being sub-
sidized. For example, Priest claims that "[t]he adoption of
claims-made policies and retro-date provisions are responses, in
part, to the substantial disagreement and continuing uncertainty
among United States jurisdictions with respect to whether a pro-
vider's liability dates from the occurrence of the injury or its
manifestation. ' 61  However, with regard to this legal uncer-
tainty, it is hard to see how individual insureds would be in a
better position to know whether they are high- or low-risk mem-
bers of the insurance pool than the companies that offer them
insurance.
While it is certainly an empirical question, the class of (a)
new, legally created (b) heterogeneous risks that (c) insurance
companies cannot differentiate but that (d) insureds can, seems
too small to explain all the recent behavior of insurance markets.
Thus, although Priest's theory is internally coherent, its reliance
on asymmetric information seems to exclude some of the most
important aspects of the insurance crisis.62
C. Alternative Collusive Explanations
Even if Priest is correct that the changes in the CGL forms
reduced buyer heterogeneity, this could also explain why the
change of forms increased the industry's ability to collude.
60. Priest's own observation that long tails of liability exposure "are increasingly
common in chemical, pharmaceutical, and hazardous waste industries," provides a ready
example of how insurers might disaggregate heterogeneous risk pools. Priest, supra note 7,
at 1575.
61. Id.
62. Priest suggests that the growth of self-insurance groups, and the convergence of
premiums to aggregate coverage among firms that purchase insurance, provides empirical
support for his hypothesis of asymmetric information. Id. at 1575-76. But the increase in
self-insurance could simply be the product of rationing. When insureds get closed out of




Structural theories of collusion posit that the ability of firms to
collude successfully depends on the characteristics of the envi-
ronment in which they operate.63 As George Stigler noted,64
homogeneity among buyers is a structural condition favorable to
collusion. The more buyers resemble each other, the easier it is
for a cartel to reach agreement and detect price shading by an
individual firm.65 Thus, increased homogeneity among consum-
ers enhances the ability to collude.
If, as Priest suggests, the ISO changes made the industry's
output more homogeneous, the new forms would have enhanced
the ability to collude. According to Priest, changes in tort doc-
trine increased the heterogeneity of the risk pool to which a
given type of insurance policy was sold. Other things being
equal, this increased heterogeneity would have made collusion
more difficult.6 6 Seen in this light, the unbundling of the CGL
forms might be reasonable as a response to the greater diversity
among insurance risks, but for collusive, rather than Priest's
competitive, reasons. Priest's own insight might be turned on its
head to provide the needed mechanism, outlined above,67 for
explaining how unbundling insurance coverage could have
increased the industry's ability to collude.
A second possible collusive explanation for defendants' con-
duct derives from the fact that claims-made policies with retro-
active provisions make it more difficult for insureds to switch
insurers. Under an occurrence form policy covering a given
year, an insured is covered for all events that occur during that
year, regardless of when the claim for insurance is actually
made. If the insured switches companies in the interval between
the initial incident and the filing of a claim, the old insurance
policy still covers that claim.
Under a claims-made form with a retroactive provision, the
insured is covered only if both the underlying event and the
63. See Ayres, supra note 37, at 295; Weiss, The Structure-Conduct-Performance
Paradigm and Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1104 (1979).
64. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964).
65. "When no two orders are ever exactly alike or when there is leeway for deviations
from the ... product specifications in hundreds of particulars .... coordination on joint
profit-maximizing strategies becomes extremely difficult to maintain." F. SCHERER,
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 201 (2d ed. 1980).
66. If all insureds are identical, one need look only at the price of a standard policy to
determine if it represented chiseling on a cartel agreement. However, when insureds
become very diverse, a given customer may be offered a low price because the firm is
anxious to make another sale or because the insured is actually a low risk.
67. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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claim occur during the policy period. However, the form is gen-
erally written so that when a policy is renewed, the retroactive
date remains set at the start of the original policy, rather than
starting over again at the renewal date.68 This tends to discour-
age switching because when an insured switches, he loses cover-
age for certain long tail risks that would have been covered had
he renewed the original policy. The creation of switching costs
is a particularly effective way of facilitating market division
because by their very nature, such costs insulate a firm's demand
from price reductions by its rivals.69
Without a more detailed set of facts, an evaluation of
whether buyer heterogeneity or switching costs are of sufficient
magnitude to explain the defendants' alleged conduct is impossi-
ble. We suggest below the kind of information that would be
necessary to assess the importance of these effects.
In sum, both the states' collusion theory and Priest's com-
petitive unraveling theory fail to explain important phenomena.
The states' explanation does not demonstrate why a cartel would
seek to eliminate form coverage for long tail, pollution, and legal
fee risks (although a collusive desire to raise switching costs
might explain the long tail exclusion). Priest's unraveling theory
provides a competitive explanation for coverage exclusion but at
the price of highly restrictive assumptions. The next section
examines further failing of the collusion and competition theo-
ries and explores an exclusionary explanation of defendants'
behavior.
IV. TOWARD AN EXCLUSIONARY EXPLANATION OF
DEFENDANTS' BEHAVIOR
Concerted anticompetitive behavior may be broadly catego-
rized as either collusionary or exclusionary: collusive behavior
involves cooperation among competitors, usually to raise prices
above the competitive level; exclusionary behavior involves
attempts to exclude competitors from a market (as an antecedent
to collusion among the remaining firms).70 Rather than an
68. Fact Sheet, supra note 1, at 4.
69. Klemperer has shown that "[tihe resulting (noncooperative) equilibrium [in a
market with switching costs] may be the same as the collusive solution in an otherwise
identical market with no switching costs." Klemperer, Markets with Consumer Switching
Costs, 102 Q.J. EcON. 375, 377 (1987) (emphasis in original). Switching costs also facilitate
strictly collusive behavior, by making "chiseling" unprofitable. Id. at 386-87, 387 n.19.
70. R. POSNER, supra note 36, at 218.
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attempt to organize collusion among firms in the insurance
industry, we suggest that the defendants' behavior may have
been an effort to exclude smaller rivals from the CGL market.
An exclusionary theory of the defendants' actions is appealing
because it, unlike the collusive or competitive explanations, pro-
vides a rationale for (1) the resistance of consumers, smaller
insurance companies, and the ISO to using the new claims-made
forms; and (2) the defendants' attempts to remove the old occur-
rence form even as an alternative for their rivals.
A. Explaining Rivals' Resistance
Competitive or collusionary theories of the attempt to elim-
inate the old occurrence form have difficulties in explaining a
series of anomalous facts. If the occurrence form (with the pol-
lution and legal fee coverage) was unprofitable, why should a
boycott have been necessary to get the industry to abandon it? If
the old form was a guaranteed money loser, why were many
firms seemingly so wedded to it; why was there resistance to
switching to the new form; and why does the occurrence form
(without pollution coverage) still dominate the CGL market?71
The apparent failure of the claims-made form to replace the
occurrence form runs counter to both the Priest and the collu-
sionary theories of the insurance crisis. Priest argues that "[tihe
adoption of claims-made policies is a way to salvage some form
of insurance availability" 72 by "narrow[ing] risk pools and
mak[ing] them attractive to low-risk members."73 If Priest is
correct, low-risk insureds should have preferred claims-made to
occurrence forms because the former offer narrower risk pools
with less cross-subsidization. Even high-risk insureds should
have preferred the claims-made forms to a complete unraveling
of the market, which would leave them with no possibility of
obtaining insurance. Moreover, if the claims-made form was, as
Priest asserts, a superior instrument for providing insurance to
at least some elements of a deteriorating risk pool, it is hard to
71. Greenwald, supra note 5, at 36, 37, cites industry observers who point out that the
claims-made form has not been widely accepted. An Outrageous Waste, supra note 5, at 8,
notes: "As everyone knows, the claims-made CGL form has been a flop. Indeed, even the
revised occurrence form is a flop. The most widely used CGL form is still the 1973
occurrence form, albeit with an exclusion for all pollution damages."
72. Priest, supra note 7, at 1575.
73. Id. at 1574;
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explain why many smaller insurance companies and the ISO
resisted the introduction of such policies.
The defendants' attempts to eliminate ISO support even as
an alternative to the newly promulgated claims-made form cre-
ates an even larger tension with competitive explanations.
Priest's theory attempts to explain why individual insurance
companies would favor the claims-made form, but it offers no
explanation for the defendants' alleged interest in prohibiting
their rivals from using the old occurrence forms. Indeed,
Priest's theory seems to suggest that defendants should have
applauded their rivals' unprofitable preference to insure unrav-
eling risks.
Consumer resistance to the claims-made form also appears
inconsistent with the collusion theories, however. The claims-
made form's lack of acceptance indicates consumer dissatisfac-
tion with the coverage exclusions. As argued earlier,74 it is
hardly plausible that insurance companies would have colluded
to sell to insureds products they did not want. Moreover, the
collusive theories cannot readily explain the resistance on the
part of smaller insurance companies or the ISO to the claims-
made form.7
These anomalous facts do suggest a third possibility, how-
ever. Perhaps the defendants' objective was not to induce rivals
to collude with them in charging higher prices, but to exclude
rivals from the market by choosing forms with which the
defendants had a competitive advantage. The large and growing
literature on "raising rivals' costs"' 76 has persuasively demon-
strated that such a strategy can, in theory, be effective. Activi-
ties that raise rivals' production costs and make production
unprofitable can drive rivals from a market. If the switch to new
74. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
75. Moreover, in light of the Matsushita decision, the apparent failure of the collusive
agreement (if there ever was such a thing) suggests that plaintiffs would be ill advised to
argue a collusive motive for defendants' conduct. "The alleged conspiracy's failure to
achieve its ends in the two decades of its asserted operation is strong evidence that the
conspiracy does not in fact exist." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 592 (1986).
76. See Ayres, supra note 37, at 308-09; Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive
Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986);
Krattenmaker & Salop, Competition and Cooperation in the Market for Exclusionary
Rights, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 109 (1986) (Papers & Proceedings); Salop & Scheffman,
Raising Rivals' Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REv. 267 (1983) (Papers and Proceedings); see also
Ordover & Saloner, Predation, Monopolization, and Antitrust, in HANDBOOK OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (R. Schmalensee & R. Willig eds.) (forthcoming 1989).
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forms was in some way disadvantageous to the small firms but
advantageous to the large ones that organized the boycott, then
the defendants' lobbying to eliminate ISO support of old forms
can be viewed as an exclusionary attempt to raise the costs of
their rivals.7 The resistance to the new forms by the industry as
a whole, as well as by consumers, would be a predictable
response to such exclusion.
How, then, might such a "raising rivals' cost" strategy
work? We offer two possibilities. First, any change in the forms
that increases fixed costs will leave smaller firms disadvantaged
vis-A-vis larger ones. The move to the new claims-made forms
and the exclusion of what had been standard coverage (for
example, coverage of pollution) may have entailed certain fixed
startup costs. For example, new computer programs have to be
written to monitor claims under the new policies and new actua-
rial analyses must be done to determine pricing for the new
forms. Most of these costs are constant regardless of the volume
of insurance issued; the cost to rewrite a computer program
capable of tracking 100 policies is the same as the cost to rewrite
a program capable of tracking 10,000 policies. But since larger
companies can spread these fixed costs over a larger number of
policies, they gain a cost advantage over smaller rivals.78
A second means by which the claims-made forms might
give an advantage to larger firms arises from the nature of the
retroactive provision. As discussed earlier,7 9 the use of claims-
made polices with retroactive provisions could make it more dif-
ficult for insureds to switch insurers. Realizing that under the
claims-made policies they will be tied to individual insurance
companies, insureds may choose the larger insurance providers
who have more secure and longer standing claims reputations.
77. Although Salop and others have conceived of the "raising rivals' cost" strategy
solely as an exclusionary device, see Salop & Scheffman, supra note 76, "[t]he ability to
raise the costs of other firms can (also] be used as a collusive practice .... [I]f a cartel
member breached the collusive agreement, the cartel could credibly punish by raising the
breaching firm's cost." Ayres, supra note 37, at 308. The collusive theory of the
reinsurance boycott provides an example of raising rivals' costs as a punishment. Under
the states' collusion theory, failure to abide by the claims-made conspiracy would result in
higher costs of reinsurance. In contrast, under the present exclusionary theory, forcing
rivals to use the claims-made forms increased their costs and thus drove them from the
market.
78. Much depends, of course, on the magnitude of these additional fixed costs caused
by the move to the new forms. Without more discovery, economists could tell either side a
convincing story.
79. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
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Thus, forcing smaller insurance companies to write only claims-
made policies might put the smaller firms at a competitive
disadvantage.80
Without more factual support, both mechanisms for raising
rivals' costs are speculative. A satisfying theory of the defend-
ants' behavior, however, must not only explain why the defend-
ants wanted to use the new claims-made form, but also (1) why
they wanted to force their rivals to use the forms and (2) why the
rivals, the ISO, and the insureds resisted the use of the forms.
Although the precise mechanism of how the new forms disad-
vantaged smaller insurance companies is, at this point, conjec-
tural, an exclusionary theory can explain these otherwise
perplexing phenomena.81
B. Eliminating the Old Occurrence Form: A
Non-Exclusionary Explanation?
The previous section suggested that the defendants' interest
in forcing the new claims-made form on their rivals was an
attempt to exclude by putting their rivals at a competitive disad-
vantage. A nonexclusionary interpretation of this behavior,
however, might be found in an analysis of information pooling.
As discussed above, 2 using standard forms to pool actuarial
information significantly reduces the costs of providing insur-
ance. For smaller firms, such pooled information may even be
an essential input. By pooling the comparable claims data of
standard polices, insurers can develop a more accurate picture of
the claims that are likely to be made under a given type of pol-
icy. Thus, it may be welfare enhancing to have a single insur-
ance form rather than to allow companies to offer a number of
different forms.13
80. Raising the insured's switching cost is formally a demand impairing action. See
Ordover & Saloner, supra note 76, at 42 (placing a rival at a competitive disadvantage "can
be accomplished by raising the rival's costs or by impairing its ability to generate demand
for its product").
81. An exclusionary theory is also supported by anecdotal evidence that a smaller
insurance company decided to stop selling CGL insurance after the incidents at issue in the
case. Telephone conversation with G. Sampson, supra note 25.
82. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
83. This point has been recognized implicitly in the congressional exemption of the
insurance industry from antitrust laws in the McCarran-Ferguson Act; it has also been
recognized explicitly by a leading group of insurance purchasers, the Risk and Insurance
Management Society, Inc. (RIMS). In a response to the Attorneys General's complaints,
RIMS noted,
As risk managers and consumers [of insurance) we are acutely aware that
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However, companies might not independently and volunta-
rily choose to use a single form. When any single company
decides to use an additional form, some of the social costs of that
decision (the decrease in informational accuracy for claims
against the first form) accrue to other firms; but the firm itself
captures the benefits of the decision (presumably, sales to margi-
nal consumers). Hence, collective decisions to use a single form
might be necessary. 4
Collective decisions to pool information have been affirmed
in other contexts. In 1918, Justice Brandeis upheld a rule of the
Chicago Board of Trade that prohibited after-hours trading at
other than the closing price on the exchange. 85 The Supreme
Court's opinion has been justified on the ground that the after-
hours rule prevented traders from "free riding"86 on the
exchange's information: "The people who traded after hours,
i.e., off the Board of Trade, may have been free riders using the
information generated by the transactions on Board to decide at
what price to sell after hours, without compensating the (other)
members of the Board for the information. '8 7 The after-hours
rule both stopped members from free riding on the exchange's
price information and forced members to share or pool the infor-
mation of all trades by letting it be consolidated with the other
transactions into a single market price.
The defendants may claim that the insurance context is
analogous: just as every decision to buy or sell a bushel of wheat
conveys some information to those not party to the transaction,
each claim filed against a given type of insurance policy reveals
something to the industry as a whole about the nature of the risk
being insured. Under this interpretation, the effort to persuade
the industry to use a single form was meant not to exclude the
smaller firms, but instead to pool information efficiently.
common coverage policy forms provide benchmarks that enable insurance buyers
and regulators to compare coverage among insurers.
... A wide variety of forms would produce more litigation, more conflicting
judicial interpretations and lead to more confusion in the marketplace.
Statement of the Risk and Insurance Management Society, Inc., quoted in Antitrust Suit
Litigation Puts Focus on State Regulations, Bus. INS., Apr. 25, 1988, at I.
84. See R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 24, at 1045 ("Information pools
... involve extensive cooperation among insurance firms.").
85. Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
86. Free riding has been defined: "When people use a valuable good without paying





This analogy, however, is flawed. Although the after-hours
traders could be accused of free riding on the exchange's price
information, it is difficult to see how the small insurance compa-
nies' refusal to change to the claims-made form gives them free
rides on the claims-made information pool. Instead, the after-
hours rule and defendants' attempts to eliminate the occurrence
form are analogous only in that both force the pooling of
information.
Although the prevention of free riding is laudable, it is
much less tenable to argue that small insurers have an obligation
to produce information for the defendants. Even if using a sin-
gle form is more efficient than multiple forms, there is no reason
why the defendants should have a right to impose their form on
unwilling rivals. To make the Chicago Board of Trade analogy
compelling, the defendants at a minimum would need to explain
why their rivals resisted the new forms, and why, given this dif-
ference of opinion, society should favor the claims-made form."8
Moreover, it is at least possible that claims-made insurers
could "translate" occurrence form data into claims-made data,
so that the industry's experience with the old occurrence form
would not need to be abandoned in setting policies under the
new form. As the Figure in the Appendix demonstrates, insur-
ers might be able to estimate what their exposure under the old
occurrence forms would have been had they used claims-made
forms. They could accomplish this estimation by eliminating the
long tail risks to recreate the claims-made data. If such data
translation or "reverse engineering" were possible-by eliminat-
ing long tail claims (or similarly, by censoring pollution or legal
fees claims) from the database-then even under Chicago Board
of Trade, the defendants would have had little reason to force
their rivals to use new claims-made forms.89
V. CONCLUSION
We have examined three theories that seek to explain the
88. Information pooling can explain the necessity of a concerted agreement (and its
enforcement), but cannot, without a theory of buyer or seller heterogeneity, explain the
rivals' resistance to entering the agreement. By way of contrast, the externality of the
prisoners' dilemma can only be cured by an enforceable agreement, but the prisoners in the
game would never be reluctant to enter such an agreement. See G. OWEN, GAME THEORY
129 (1983); Ayres, supra note 37, at 298.
89. Note, however, that the claims-made data cannot be translated into occurrence
data. Because claims-made data sets will not reveal information about long tail or other
excluded risks, occurrence insurers would face an asymmetric data disadvantage.
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defendants' alleged action. The states' theory that the defend-
ants sought to collude is the least plausible because it fails to
explain how the complete elimination of certain types of insur-
ance coverage could be profitable (with the possible caveat -that
the higher switching costs of the new forms could facilitate
collusion).
Priest's theory of the insurance crisis corrects this failure by
arguing that competitive unraveling made certain risks uninsur-
able. However, competitive unraveling depends crucially on the
assumption that insurers cannot differentiate between high- and
low-risk consumers but that the consumers themselves can.
Moreover, Priest's theory fails to explain why the defendants'
rivals, the ISO, and the consumers themselves resisted the
defendants' proposed forms.
The attraction of our exclusionary theory is that it can
account for both the defendants' efforts to eliminate certain
types of coverage and the rivals' and consumers' resistance. Our
exclusionary motive is plausible, however, only if the larger
firms had the ability to raise the costs of their rivals.9" This abil-
ity in turn depends on the extent to which the new forms were
somehow differentially more costly for smaller firms than for
larger insurance companies. The defendants' efforts to impose
the new forms on the industry might have put their rivals at a
competitive disadvantage if the smaller insurance firms were
made thereby to absorb fixed startup costs or if the new forms
more effectively tied insureds to individual insurers for longer
periods. Perhaps the large firms lacked the ability to raise their
rivals' costs in this precise manner, but the ability of the exclu-
sion theory to account for coverage elimination and rivals' resist-
ance warrants further attention. 91
As the foregoing analysis indicates, these alternative theo-
ries capture different aspects of a complex reality. 92 Our choice
90. Moreover, to be profitable the exclusionary strategy must also work to raise
prospective rivals' costs as an entry barrier to deter potential competition.
91. We do not mean to suggest that these explanations must be taken as mutually
exclusive. It could well be, for example, that as markets were unraveling, insurance
companies saw an increased opportunity to collude and took advantage of it, much as
cigarette companies seized on the Great Depression of the 1930s to cartelize their industry.
See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
92. Ralph Winter has recently published an insightful alternative explanation of the
insurance crisis. Winter, The Liability Crisis and the Dynamics of Competitive Insurance
Markets, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 455 (1988). Winter's approach parallels both that of Priest
and of this Article, in that Winter tests the competing explanations of the crisis against
certain stylized facts. Specifically, Winter proposes a sophisticated cyclical model of the
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among the competing explanations must ultimately turn on
"goodness of fit"-which theory best explains the phenomena of
interest. 9 3 The process of discovery will challenge the collusive,
competitive, and exclusionary theories to explain a larger and
more detailed set of facts, further distinguishing the theories.
This Article has suggested that explaining the defendants' desire
to force claims-made forms on their rivals and the rivals' and
consumers' resistance are central issues for further investiga-
tion.94 While the states' explanation of the case lacks plausibil-
ity, their allegations can support a coherent theory of attempted
exclusion. Moreover, the exclusionary theory is more persuasive
than currently articulated competitive alternatives. Under these
circumstances, the plaintiffs' (possibly amended) complaint
should withstand an initial motion to dismiss.
In the end, residual ambiguities and unexplained behavior
will likely remain. In this void, the court's initial presumption
may become determinative.95 Much will turn on whether soci-
ety starts with a presumption that antitrust law should prohibit
behavior inconsistent with competition or permit behavior
inconsistent with collusion or exclusion. Although Chicago
school theorists have advocated strong initial presumptions of
competition,96 courts might pause before construing boycotts of
unclear purpose in defendants' favor-especially when defend-
ants attempt to dictate the products that their rivals can sell.
insurance market as a competitive explanation of defendants' behavior and the ensuing
crisis. Like Priest's theory, however, Winter's model cannot explain the defendants' rivals'
resistance to the proposed ISO changes. Moreover, he does not address whether the
cyclical effects of his theory could have enhanced defendants' exclusionary or collusionary
opportunities.
93. Richard Schmalensee has noted that the rich proliferation of models in industrial
organization and antitrust analysis means that scholars and policymakers cannot simply
plunk down "the" model and expect it to grind out a correct understanding of real-world
behavior for them. Schmalensee, On the Use of Economic Models in Antitrust The
Realemon Case, 127 U. PA. L. Rv. 994 (1979).
94. For example, exploring the changes in insurance premiums and insurers' costs
under the various forms may help validate or reject specific theories. Attention should also
be paid to the insurers' interest in participating in the boycott. For example, if the small
insurers' default risks were particularly significant for long tail risks, reinsurers who would
be held jointly and severally liable might have incentives to reduce the systemic risk of
default by prohibiting certain types of coverage.
95. Characterization may also play an important role. Under traditional doctrine,
much can turn on the success of advocates to characterize the events as per se (rather than
rule of reason) violations. R. POSNER, supra note 36, at 135.





COVERAGE UNDER 3 INSURANCE POLICIES
(1) Old Occurrence Form
t. 1  --I -




(2) Claims Made Form, No Retroactive Date
-------------...-.... y... ..-......... X ------- >Time
... -- ..... Xf----------- -[ ------ > Time
t.1 to t' tI t2
(3) New Claims Made Form, with Retroactive Date
-------------- - - ; 1 -------- > Time
t-1 to t tI t2
KEY:
- = Period covered by policy
= A claim covered by policy
X = A claim not covered by policy
We take the hypothetical case of insurance for damages
resulting from a worker's exposure to asbestos. Under an occur-
rence policy in effect from time to to tj, the employer will be
covered if the exposure occurs at time t' even if the claim is not
filed until t2. Claims based on exposure at time t-1 (or t2) will not
be covered even if the claim is made at time t', while the policy is
in effect.
A claims-made policy in effect from time to to t1 will cover
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exposure to asbestos at time t-1 and filed at time t' will be cov-
ered. A claim filed at time t2 will not be covered, even if it is
based on exposure that occurred at time t'.
A claims-made policy with a retroactive date set at the start
of the policy period covers only those situations in which both
the exposure and the claim occur during the period from to to tj.
If either the exposure or the claim falls outside of this interval,
the policy will not provide coverage.

